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ABSTRACT. I describe in this paper an ontological solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin 
with describing the hyper-entanglement urn experiment. I restate first the Sleeping Beauty problem 
from a wider perspective than the usual opposition between halfers and thirders. I also argue that the  
Sleeping  Beauty experiment  is  best  modelled  with  the  hyper-entanglement  urn.  I  draw then  the 
consequences  of  considering  that  some  balls  in  the  hyper-entanglement  urn  have  ontologically 
different properties form normal ones. In this context, considering a Monday-waking (drawing a red 
ball) leads to two different situations that are assigned each a different probability. This leads to a two-
sided account of the Sleeping Beauty problem. On the one hand, the first situation is handled by the  
argument for 1/3. On the other hand, the second situation corresponds to a reasoning that echoes the 
argument for 1/2.
1. The hyper-entanglement urn
Let us consider the following experiment. In front of you is an urn. The experimenter asks you to  
study very carefully the properties of the balls that are in the urn. You go up then to the urn and begin 
to  examine its  content carefully.  You note  first  that  the  urn contains  only red or  green balls.  By 
curiosity, you decide to take a sample of a red ball in the urn. Surprisingly, you notice that while you 
pick up this red ball, another ball, but a green one, also moves simultaneously. You decide then to  
replace the red ball in the urn and you notice that immediately, the latter green ball also springs back in 
the urn. Intrigued, you decide then to catch this green ball. You notice then that the red ball also goes  
out of the urn at the same time. Furthermore, while you replace the green ball in the urn, the red ball  
also springs back at the same time at its initial position in the urn. You decide then to withdraw another 
red ball from the urn. But while it goes out of the urn, nothing else occurs. Taken aback, you decide 
then to undertake a systematic and rigorous study of all the balls in the urn. 
At the end of several hours of a meticulous examination, you are now capable of describing precisely 
the properties of the balls present in the urn. The latter contains in total 1000 red balls and 500 green  
balls. Among the red balls, 500 are completely normal balls. But 500 other red balls have completely  
astonishing properties. Indeed, each of them is linked to a different green ball. When you remove one 
of these red balls, the green ball which is associated with it also goes out at the same time from the  
urn, as if it was linked to the red ball by a magnetic force. Indeed, if you remove the red ball from the  
urn, the linked green ball also disappears instantly. And conversely, if you withdraw from the urn one  
of the green balls, the red ball which is linked to it is immediately removed from the urn. You even try 
to destroy one of the balls of a linked pair of balls, and you notice that in such case, the ball of the  
other colour which is indissociably linked to it is also destroyed instantaneously. Indeed, it seems to 
you that relative to these pairs of balls, the red ball and the green ball which is linked to it behave as  
one single object.
The functioning of this urn leaves you somewhat perplexed. In particular, your are intrigued by the  
properties of the pairs of correlated balls. After reflection, you tell yourself that the properties of the  
pairs of  correlated balls  are finally in some respects identical  to those of two entangled quantum 
objects. Entanglement (Aspect & al. 1982) is indeed the phenomenon which links up two quantum 
objects  (for  example,  two photons),  so that  the  quantum state  of  one of  the  entangled objects  is  
correlated or anti-correlated with the quantum state of the other, whatever the distance where the latter 
is situated. As a consequence, each quantum object can not be fully described as an object per se, and a 
pair of entangled quantum objects is better conceived of as associated with a single, entangled state.  It  
occurs to you that perhaps a pair of correlated balls could be considered, alternatively, as an ubiquitous 
object, i.e. as an object characterised by its faculty of occupying two different locations at the same  
time, with the colours of its two occurrences being anti-correlated. Setting this issue aside for the  
moment, you prefer to retain the similarity with the more familiar quantum objects. You decide to call  
“hyper-entanglement  urn”  this  urn  with  its  astonishing  properties.  After  reflection,  what  appears  
specific with this urn, is that it includes at the same time some normal and some hyper-entangled balls.  
The normal red balls  have nothing different  with our familiar  balls.  But  hyper-entangled balls  do 
behave  in  a  completely  different  way.  What  is  amazing,  you  think,  is  that  nothing  seemingly 
differentiates the normal red balls from the red hyper-entangled ones. You tell yourself finally that it  
could be confusing.
Your reflection on the pairs of hyper-entangled balls and their properties also leads you to question 
the way the balls which compose the pairs of hyper-entangled balls are to be counted. Are they to be  
counted as normal balls? Or do specific rules govern the way these pairs of hyper-entangled balls are  
to  be counted?  You add a  normal  red ball  in  an hyper-entanglement  urn.  It  is  then  necessary to  
increment the number of red balls present in the urn. On the other hand, the total number of green balls  
is unaffected. But what when you add in the hyper-entanglement urn the red ball of a pair of hyper-
entangled balls? In that case, the linked green ball of the same pair of hyper-entangled balls is also 
added instantly in the urn. Hence, when you add a red ball of a pair of hyper-entangled balls in the urn,  
it also occurs that you add at the same time its associated green ball. So, in that case, you must not  
only increment the total number of red balls, but also the total number of green balls present in the urn.  
In the same way, if you withdraw a normal red ball from the urn, you simply decrement the total  
number of red balls of the urn, and the number of green balls in the urn is unaffected. But if you  
remove the red ball  (resp. green) of a pair of hyper-entangled balls, you must decrement the total  
number of red balls (resp. green) present in the urn as well as the total number of green balls (resp.  
red). 
At this very moment,  the experimenter happens again and withdraws all  balls  from the urn.  He 
announces that you are going to participate in the following experiment: 
The hyper-entanglement urn* A fair coin will be randomly tossed. If the coin lands Heads, the  
experimenter will put in the urn a normal red ball. On the other hand, if the coin lands Tails, he will  
put  in  the  urn a pair  of  hyper-entangled balls,  composed of  a  red ball  and a green ball,  both 
indissociably linked. The experimenter also adds that the room will be put in absolute darkness, 
and that you will therefore be completely unable to detect the colour of the balls, no more that you 
will be able to know, when you will have withdrawn a ball from the urn, whether it is a normal ball, 
or a ball which is part of a pair of hyper-entangled balls. The experimenter tosses the coin and 
while you catch a ball from the urn, he asks you to assess the likelihood that the coin felt Heads.
2. The Sleeping Beauty problem
Consider now the well-known  Sleeping Beauty problem (Elga 2000, Lewis 2001). Sleeping Beauty 
learns that she will be put into sleep on Sunday by some researchers. A fair coin will be tossed and if  
the coin lands Heads, Beauty will be awakened once on Monday. On the other hand, if the coin lands 
Tails, Beauty will be awakened twice: on Monday and on Tuesday. After each waking, she will be put  
into sleep again and will forget that waking. Furthermore, once awakened, Beauty will have no idea of 
whether it is Monday or Tuesday. On awakening on Monday, what should then be Beauty's credence 
that the coin did land Heads?
At this step, one obvious first answer (I) goes as follows: since the coin is fair, the initial probability  
that the coin lands Head is 1/2. But during the course of the experiment, Sleeping Beauty does not get 
any novel information. Hence, the probability of Heads still remains 1/2.
By contrast, an alternative reasoning (II) runs as follows. Suppose the experiment is repeated many 
times, say, to fix ideas, 1000 times. Then there will be approximately 500 Heads-wakings on Monday,  
500 Tails-wakings on Monday and 500 Tails-wakings on Tuesday.  Hence,  the reasoning goes, the 
probability of Heads equals 500/1500 = 1/3. 
The argument for 1/2 and the argument for 1/3 yield conflicting conclusions. The Sleeping Beauty 
problem is usually presented accordingly as a problem arising from conflicting conclusions resulting 
2
from the two above-mentioned competing lines of reasoning aiming at assigning the probability of  
Heads once Beauty is awakened. I shall argue, however, that this statement of the Sleeping Beauty 
problem is restrictive and that we need to envisage the issue from a wider perspective. For present  
purposes, the Sleeping Beauty problem is the issue of calculating properly (i) the probability of Heads  
(resp. Tails) once Beauty is awakened; (ii) the probability of waking on Monday (resp. Tuesday); and  
(iii) the probability of Heads (resp. Tails) on waking on Monday.  From the halfer perspective, the 
probability of waking on Monday equals 3/4, and the  probability of  waking on Tuesday is 1/4. By 
contrast,  from the thirder's  perspective,  the  probability of  waking on Monday equals  2/3 and the 
probability of  waking on Tuesday is 1/3.
But the argument for 1/2 and for 1/3 also have their own account of conditional probabilities. To 
begin with, the probability of Heads on waking on Tuesday is not a subject of disagreement, for it  
equals 0 in both accounts. The same goes for the probability of Tails on waking on Tuesday, since it  
equals 1 from the halfer's or from the thirder's viewpoint. But agreement stops when one considers the  
probability of Heads on waking on Monday. For it equals 2/3 from a halfer's perspective. However,  
from a thirder's perspective, it amounts to 1/2. On the other hand, the probability of Tails on waking on  
Monday is 1/3 from a halfer standpoint, and 1/2 for a thirder.
3. The urn analogy
In what follows, I shall present an ontological solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem, which rests  
basically on the hyper-entanglement urn* experiment.  A specific  feature of this  account is  that  it  
incorporates insights from the halfer and thirder standpoints, a line of resolution initiated by Nick 
Bostrom (2007) that has recently inspired some new contributions (Groisman 2008, Delabre 2008)1. 
The argument for 1/3 and the argument for 1/2 rest basically on an urn analogy. This analogy is made 
explicit in the argument for 1/3 but is less transparent in the argument for 1/2. The argument for 1/3, to  
begin with, is based on an urn analogy which associates the situation related to the Sleeping Beauty  
experiment with an urn that contains, in the long run (assuming that the experiment is repeated, say,  
1000 times), 500 red balls (Heads-wakings on Monday), 500 red balls (Tails-wakings on Monday) and  
500 green balls (Tails-wakings on Tuesday), i.e. 1000 red balls and 500 green balls in total. In this  
context, the probability of Heads upon awakening is determined by the ratio of the number of Heads-
wakings to the total number of wakings. Hence, P(Heads) = 500/1500 =1/3. The balls in the urn are  
normal ones and for present purposes, it is worth calling this sort of urn a “standard urn”.
On the other hand, the argument for 1/2 is also based on an urn analogy, albeit less transparently. The  
main halfer proponent grounds his reasoning on calculations (Lewis 2001), but for the sake of clarity,  
it is worth rendering the underlying associated analogy more apparent. For this purpose, let us recall  
how the calculation of the probability of drawing a red ball is handled by the argument for 1/2. If the 
coin lands Heads then the probability of drawing a red ball is 1, and if the coin lands Tails then this  
latter probability equals 1/2. We get then accordingly the probability of drawing a red ball (Monday-
waking): P(R) = 1 x 1/2 + 1/2 x 1/2 = 3/4. By contrast, if the coin lands Tails, we calculate as follows  
the probability of drawing a green ball (Tuesday-waking): P(G) = 0 x 1/2 + 1/2 x 1/2 = 1/4. To sum up,  
according to the argument for 1/3: P(R) = 3/4 and P(G) = 1/4. For the sake of comparison, it is worth  
transposing  this  reasoning  in  terms  of  an  urn  analogy.  Suppose  then  that  the  Sleeping  Beauty 
experiment is iterated. It appears then that the argument for 1/2 is based on an analogy with a standard 
urn that contains 3/4 of red balls and 1/4 of green ones. These balls are also normal ones and the  
analogy underlying the argument for 1/2 is also with a “standard urn”. Now assuming as above that the 
experiment is repeated 1000 times, we get accordingly an urns that contains 500 red balls (Heads-
wakings on Monday), 250 red balls (Tails-wakings on Monday) and 250 green balls (Tails-wakings on 
Tuesday), i.e. 750 red balls and 250 green balls in total. Such content of the urn results directly from 
Lewis' calculation. However, as it stands, this analogy would arguably be a poor argument in favour of 
the halfer's viewpoint. But at this step, we should pause and consider that Lewis' argument for 1/2 did  
not rely on this urn analogy, though the latter is a consequence of Lewis' calculation. We shall now 
turn to the issue of whether the standard urn is the correct analogy for the Sleeping Beauty experiment.
1 Bostrom opens the path to a third way out to the Sleeping Beauty problem: “At any rate, one might hope that 
having a third contender for how Beauty should reason will  help stimulate new ideas in the study of self-
location”.  In  his  account,  Bostrom  sides  with  the  halfer  on  P(Heads)  and  with  the  thirder  on  conditional  
probabilities, but his treatment has some counter-intuitive consequences on conditional probabilities.
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In effect, it turns out that the argument for 1/3 and the argument for 1/2 are based on an analogy with  
a standard urn. But at this stage, a question arises: is the analogy with the standard urn well-suited to 
the Sleeping Beauty experiment? In other terms, isn't another urn model best suited? In the present 
context, this alternative can be formulated more accurately as follows: isn't the situation inherent to the  
Sleeping Beauty experiment better put in analogy with the hyper-entanglement urn, rather than with 
the standard urn? I shall argue, however, that the analogy with the standard urn is mistaken, for it fails  
to incorporate an essential feature of the experiment, namely the fact that Monday-Tails wakings are  
indissociable from Tuesday-Tails wakings. For in the Tails case, Beauty cannot wake up on Monday 
without also waking up on Tuesday and reciprocally, she cannot wake up on Tuesday without also 
waking up on Monday. 
When one reasons with the standard urn, one feels intuitively entitled to add red-Heads (Heads-
wakings  on  Monday),  red-Tails  (Tails-wakings  on  Monday)  and  green-Tails  (Tails-wakings  on 
Tuesday) balls to compute frequencies. But red-Heads and red-Tails balls appear to be objects of a  
fundamentally different nature in the present context.  In effect,  red-Heads balls are in all  respects  
similar to our familiar objects, and can be considered properly as single objects. By contrast, it turns  
out that red-Tails balls are quite indissociable from green-Tails balls. For we cannot draw a red-Tails  
ball without picking up the associated green-Tails ball. And conversely, we cannot draw a green-Tails  
ball without picking up the associated red-Tails ball. In this sense, red-Tails balls and the associated  
green-Tails balls do not behave as our familiar objects, but are much similar to entangled quantum 
objects. For Monday-Tails wakings are indissociable from Tuesday-Tails wakings. On Tails, Beauty 
cannot  be awakened on Monday (resp.  Tuesday)  without  being also awakened on Tuesday (resp.  
Monday). From this viewpoint, it is mistaken to consider red-Tails and green-Tails balls as separate 
objects. The correct intuition, I shall argue, is that the red-Tails and the associated green-Tails ball can 
be assimilated to a pair of hyper-entangled balls and constitute but one single object. In this context,  
red-Tails and green-Tails balls are best seen intuitively as constituents and mere parts of one single  
object. In other words, red-Heads balls and, on the other hand, red-Tails and green-Tails balls, cannot 
be considered as objects of the same type for probability purposes. And this situation justifies the fact  
that one is not entitled to add unrestrictedly red-Heads, red-Tails and green-Tails balls to compute 
probability frequencies. For in this case, one adds objects of intrinsically different types, i.e. one single 
object with the mere part of another single object.
Given what precedes, the correct analogy, I contend, is with an hyper-entanglement urn rather than 
with a normal urn. As will become clearer later, this new analogy incorporates the strengths of both  
above-mentioned analogies with the standard urn. And we shall now consider the Sleeping Beauty 
problem in light of this new perspective. 
4. Consequences of the analogy with the hyper-entanglement urn
At this step, it is worth drawing the consequences of the analogy with the hyper-entanglement urn, that 
notably result  from the  ontological  properties  of  the  balls.  Now the  key point  proves  to  be  the 
following one. Recall that nothing seemingly distinguishes normal balls from hyper-entangled ones 
within the hyper-entanglement urn. And among the red balls, half are normal ones, but the other half is  
composed of red balls that are each hyper-entangled with a different green ball. If one considers the  
behaviour of the balls, it turns out that normal balls behave as usual. But hyper-entangled ones do 
behave differently, with regard to statistics. Suppose I add the red ball of an hyper-entangled pair into 
the hyper-entanglement urn. Then I also add instantly in the urn its associated green ball. Suppose,  
conversely, that I remove the red ball of an hyper-entangled pair from the urn. Then I also remove 
instantly its associated green ball.
At this step, we are led to the core issue of calculating properly the probability of drawing a red ball  
from the hyper-entanglement urn. Let us pause for a moment and forget temporarily the fact that,  
according to its classical formulation, the Sleeping Beauty problem arises from conflicting conclusions 
resulting from the argument for 1/3 and the argument for 1/2 on calculating the probability of Heads 
once Beauty is awakened. This could be a red herring. For as we did see it before, the problem also 
arises  from the  calculation  of  the  probability  of  waking  on  Monday (drawing  a  red  ball),  since 
conflicting conclusions also result from the two competing lines of reasoning. In effect, Elga argues  
for 2/3 and Lewis for 3/4.  Hence,  the Sleeping Beauty problem could also have been formulated  
alternatively as follows:  once awakened,  what  probability should Beauty assign to her waking on 
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Monday? In the present context, this is tantamount to the probability of drawing a red ball from the 
hyper-entanglement urn.
What is then the response of the present account, based on the analogy with the hyper-entanglement 
urn, to the issue of calculating the probability of drawing a red ball? In the present context, “drawing a  
red ball” turns out to be somewhat ambiguous. For according to the ontological properties of the balls 
within the hyper-entanglement urn, one can consider red balls either from the viewpoint of colour-
ness, or from the standpoint of object-ness2. Hence, in the present context, “drawing a red ball” can be 
interpreted in two different ways: either (i) “drawing a red ball-as-colour”; or (ii) “drawing a red ball-
as-object”. Now disambiguating the notion of drawing a red ball, we should distinguish accordingly 
between two different  questions.  First,  (i)  what  is  the  probability of  drawing a  red ball-as-colour 
(Monday-waking-as-time-segment)? Let us denote by P(R↑) the latter probability. Second, (ii) what is 
the  probability  of  drawing  a  red  ball-as-object (Monday-waking-as-object)?  Let  us  denote  it  by 
P(R→). This distinction makes sense in the present context, since it results from the properties of the  
hyper-entangled balls.  In particular,  this richer semantics results from the case where one draws a 
green ball of an hyper-entangled pair from the urn. For in the latter case, this green ball is not a red  
one,  but  it  occurs  that  one  also  picks  up  a  red  ball,  since  the  associated  red  ball  is  withdrawn 
simultaneously.
Suppose,  on  the  one  hand,  that  we  focus  on  the  colour  of  the  balls,  and  that  we  consider  the 
probability P(R↑) of drawing a red ball-as-colour. It occurs now that there are 2/3 of red  balls-as-
colour and 1/3 of green balls-as-colour in the urn. Accordingly, the  probability P(R↑) of drawing a red 
ball-as-colour equals 2/3. On the other hand, the probability P(G↑) of drawing a green ball-as-colour 
equals 1/3.
Assume, on the other hand, that we focus on balls as objects, considering that one pair of hyper-
entangled balls behaves as one single object. Now we are concerned with the probability P(R →) of 
drawing a red ball-as-object. On Heads, the probability of drawing a red ball-as-object is 1. On Tails, 
we can either draw the red or the green ball of an hyper-entangled pair. But it should be pointed out 
that  if  we draw on Tails  the green ball  of  an hyper-entangled pair,  we also pick up instantly the  
associated red ball. Hence, the probability of drawing a red ball on Tails is also 1. Thus, P(R →) = 1 x 
1/2 + 1 x 1/2 = 1. Conversely, what is the probability P(G→) of drawing a green  ball-as-object (a 
waking on Tuesday)? The probability of drawing a green ball-as-object is 0 in the Heads case, and 1 in 
the Tails case. For in the latter case, we either draw the green or the red ball of an hyper-entangled  
pair. But even if we draw the red ball of the hyper-entangled pair, we draw then instantly its associated 
green ball. Hence, P(G→) = 0 x 1/2 + 1 x 1/2 = 1/2. To sum up: P(R→) = 1 and P(G→) = 1/2. The 
probability of drawing a red  ball-as-object  (a waking on Monday) is then 1, and the probability of 
drawing a green ball-as-object (a waking on Tuesday) is 1/2. Now it turns out that P(R→) + P(G→) = 
1 + 1/2 = 1.5. In the present account, this results from the fact that drawing a red ball and drawing a  
green ball  – in general  – are not exclusive events. And – in particular  – drawing a red ball-as-object 
and  drawing  a  green  ball-as-object from  an  hyper-entangled  pair  are  not  exclusive  events for 
probability purposes. For we cannot draw the red-Tails (resp. green-Tails) ball without drawing the 
associated green-Tails (resp. red-Tails) ball.
To sum up now. It turns out that the probability P(R↑)  of drawing a red ball-as-colour (Monday-
waking-as-time-segment)  equals 2/3.  And the probability P(G↑)  of drawing a  green ball-as-colour 
(Tuesday-waking-as-time-segment) equals 1/3. On the other hand, the probability P(R→) of drawing a 
red ball-as-object (Monday-waking-as-object) equals 1; and the probability P(G→) of drawing a green 
ball-as-object (Tuesday-waking-as-object) equals 1/2.
2 This issue relates to the identity of indiscernibles and is notably hinted at by Max Black (1952, p. 156) who  
describes a universe composed of two identical spheres: “Isn't it logically possible that the universe should have 
contained nothing but two exactly similar spheres? We might suppose that each was made of chemically pure 
iron, had a diameter of one mile, that they had the same temperature, colour, and so on, and that nothing else  
existed. Then every quality and relational characteristic of the one would also be a property of the other. ” In the 
present context, it should be pointed out that the colours of the hyper-entangled balls are anti-correlated. John 
Leslie (2001, p. 153) also raises a similar issue with his paradox of the balls: “Here is a yet greater paradox for 
Identity of Indiscernibles to swallow. Try to picture a cosmos consisting just of three qualitatively identical  
spheres in a straight line, the two outer ones precisely equidistant from the one at the centre. Aren't there plain  
differences here? The central sphere must be nearer to the outer spheres than these are to each other. Identity of  
Indiscernibles shudders at the symmetry of the situation, however. It holds that the so-called two outer spheres  
must really be only a single sphere. And this single sphere, which now has all the same qualities as its sole 
surviving partner, must really be identical to it. There is actually just one sphere!”.
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At this step, we are led to the issue of calculating properly the number of balls present in the urn.  
Now we should distinguish, just as before, according to whether one considers balls-as-colour or balls-
as-object. Suppose then that we focus on the colour of the balls. Then we have grounds to consider 
that there are in total 2/3 of red balls and 1/3 of green balls in the hyper-entanglement urn, i.e. 1000 
red  ones  and  500  green  ones.  This  conforms  with  the  calculation  that  results  from the  thirder's  
standpoint. Suppose, that we rather focus on balls as single objects. Things go then differently. For we 
can consider first that there are 1000 balls as objects in the urn, i.e. 500 (red) normal ones and 500  
hyper-entangled ones. Now suppose that the 500 (red) normal balls are removed from the urn. Now 
there only remain hyper-entangled balls within the urn. Suppose then that we pick up one by one the 
remaining balls from the urn, by removing alternatively one red ball and one green ball from the urn. 
Now it turns out that we can draw 250 red ones and 250 green ones from the urn. For once we draw a  
red ball from the urn, its associated green ball is also withdrawn. And conversely, when we pick up a  
green ball from the urn, its associated red ball is also withdrawn. Hence, inasmuch as we consider  
balls as objects, there are in total 750 red ones and 250 green ones in the urn. At this step, it should be 
noticed that this corresponds accurately to the composition of the urn which is associated with Lewis' 
halfer calculation. But this now makes sense, as far as the analogy with the hyper-entanglement urn is 
concerned. The above-mentioned analogy with the urn associated with Lewis' halfer calculation was a  
poor  argument  inasmuch as the urn was a standard one,  but  things go differently when one now 
considers the analogy with the hyper-entanglement urn.
5. A two-sided account
From the  above,  it  results  that  the  line  of  reasoning which is  associated with the  balls-as-colour  
standpoint  corresponds  to  the  thirder's  reasoning.  And  conversely,  the  line  of  thought  which  is  
associated  with  the  balls-as-object  viewpoint  echoes  the  halfer's  reasoning.  Hence,  the  balls-as-
colour/balls-as-object dichotomy parallels the thirder/halfer opposition. Grounded though they are on 
an unsuited analogy with the standard urn, the argument for 1/3 and the argument for 1/2 do have,  
however, their own strengths. In particular, the analogy with the urn in the argument for 1/3 does  
justice to the fact that the Sleeping Beauty experiment entails that 2/3 of Monday-wakings will occur  
in the long run. On the other hand, the analogy with the urn in the argument for 1/2 handles adequately 
the fact that one Heads-waking is put on a par with two Tails-wakings. In the present context however,  
these two analogies turn out to be  one-sided and fail to handle adequately the probability notion of 
drawing a red ball (waking on Monday). But in the present context, the probability P(R↑) of drawing a 
red ball-as-colour corresponds to the thirder's insight. And the probability P(R→) of drawing a red 
ball-as-object corresponds to the halfer's line of thought. At this step, it  turns out that the present 
account is two-sided, since it incorporates insights from the argument for 1/3 and from the argument  
for 1/2.
Finally, it turns out that the standard urn which is usually used to model the Sleeping Beauty problem 
does not allow for two possible interpretations of the probability of drawing a red ball. Rather, in the 
standard urn model, the two interpretations are exclusive of one another and this yields the classical  
contradiction between the argument for 1/3 and the argument for 1/2. But as we did see it, with the  
hyper-entanglement urn model, this contradiction dissolves, since two different interpretations of the 
probability of drawing a red ball (waking on Monday) are now allowed, yielding then two different  
calculations. In the latter model,  these probabilities are no more exclusive of one another and the 
contradiction dissolves into complementarity. 
Now what precedes casts new light on the argument for 1/3 and the argument for 1/2. For given that 
the Sleeping Beauty experiment, is modelled with a standard urn, both accounts lack the ability to  
express the  difference between the probability P(R↑) of  drawing a  red ball-as-colour (a  Monday-
waking-as-time-segment)  and  the  probability  P(R→) of  drawing  a  red  ball-as-object (a  Monday-
waking-as-object), for it does not make sense with the standard urn. Consequently, there is a failure to  
express this difference with the standard urn analogy, when considering drawing a red ball. But such  
distinction makes sense with the analogy with the hyper-entanglement urn. For in the resulting richer 
ontology,  the distinction between P(R↑) and P(R→) yields two different results:   P(R↑) = 2/3 and 
P(R→) = 1.
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At this step, it is worth considering in more depth the balls-as-colour/balls-as-object opposition, that  
parallels the thirder/halfer contradiction. It should be pointed out that “drawing a red ball-as-colour” is 
associated with an indexical (“this ball is red”), somewhat internal standpoint, that corresponds to the  
thirder's  insight.  Typically,  the thirder's  viewpoint  considers things from the inside,  grounding the  
calculation on the indexicality of Beauty's present waking. On the other hand, “drawing a red ball-as-
object” can be associated with a non-indexical (“the ball is red”), external viewpoint. This corresponds 
to the halfer's standpoint, which can be viewed as more general and external.
At this step, it is worth recalling the diagnosis of the Sleeping Beauty problem put forth by Berry 
Groisman (2008). Groisman attributes the two conflicting responses to the probability of Heads to an  
ambiguity in the protocol of the Sleeping Beauty experiment. He argues that the argument for 1/2 is an 
adequate response to the probability of Heads on awakening, under the setup of coin tossing. On the 
other hand, he considers that the argument for 1/3 is an accurate answer to the latter probability, under 
the setup of picking up a ball from the urn. Groisman also considers that putting a ball in the box and  
picking up a  ball  out  from the box are  two different  events,  that  lead therefore  to  two different  
probabilities. Roughly speaking, Groisman's “coin tossing/picking up a ball” distinction parallels the 
present balls-as-colour/balls-as-object dichotomy. However, in the present account, putting a ball in  
the urn is no different from picking up a ball from the urn. For if we put in the urn a red ball of an  
hyper-entangled pair, we also immediately put in the urn its associated green ball. Rather, from the 
present  standpoint,  drawing  (resp.  putting  in  the  urn)  a  red  ball-as-colour  from  the  urn is 
probabilistically different from picking up  a red ball-as-object. The present account and Groisman's 
analysis share the same overall  direction,  although the details of  our motivations are significantly 
different.
As we did see it, the calculation of the probability of drawing a red ball (waking on Monday) is the 
core issue in the Sleeping Beauty problem. But what is now the response of the present account on 
conditional  probabilities and on the probability of Heads upon awakening? Let  us begin with the 
conditional probability of Heads on a Monday-waking. Recall first how the calculation goes on the  
two concurrent lines of reasoning. To begin with, the probability P(Heads|G) of Heads on drawing a 
green ball is not a subject of disagreement for halfers and thirders, since it equals 0 on both accounts.  
The same goes for the probability P(Tails|G) of Tails on drawing a green ball, since it equals 1 from  
the  halfer's  or  the  thirder's  viewpoint.  But  agreement  stops  when  one  considers  the  probability 
P(Heads|R) of Heads on drawing a red ball. For P(Heads|R) = 1/2 from the thirder's perspective and 
P(Heads|R) = 2/3 from the halfer's viewpoint. On the other hand, the probability P(Tails|R) of Tails on 
drawing a red ball is 1/2 for a thirder and 1/3 for a halfer.
Now the response of the present account to the calculation of the conditional probability of Heads on  
drawing a red ball (waking on Monday) parallels the answer made to the issue of determining the  
probability of drawing a red ball. In the present account, P(Heads|G) = 0 and P(Tails|G) = 1, as usual.  
But  we  need  to  disambiguate  how we  interpret  “drawing  a  red  ball” by distinguishing  between 
P(Heads|R↑) and P(Heads|R→), to go any further. For P(Heads|R↑) is the probability of Heads on 
drawing a red ball-as-colour. And P(Heads|R→) is the probability of Heads on drawing a red ball-as-
object. P(Heads|R↑) is calculated in the same way as in the thirder's account. Now we get accordingly: 
P(Heads|R↑) = 1/2. On the other hand, P(Heads|R→) is computed in the same way as from the halfer's 
perspective, and we get accordingly: P(Heads|R→) = [P(Heads) x P(R→|Heads)] / P(R→) = [1/2 x 
1] / 1 =  1/2. 
Now the  same  goes  for  the  probability  of  Heads  upon  awakening.  For  there  are  two  different 
responses  in  the  present  account,  depending  on  whether  one  considers  P(R↑)  or  P(R→).  If  one 
considers balls-as-colour, the probability of Heads upon awakening is calculated in the same way as in 
the argument for 1/3, and we get accordingly: P(Heads↑) = 1/3 and P(Tails↑) = 2/3. On the other hand, 
if one is concerned with balls-as-object, it ensues, in the same way as with the halfer's account, that  
there is no shift in the prior probability of Heads. As Lewis puts it, Beauty's awakening does not add 
any novel information. It follows accordingly that the probability P(Heads→) of Heads (resp. Tails) on 
awakening still remains 1/2. 
Finally, the above results are summarised in the following table:
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halfer thirder present  
account
P(Heads↑) 1/3 1/3
P(Tails↑) 2/3 2/3
P(Heads→) 1/2 1/2
P(Tails→) 1/2 1/2
P(drawing a red ball-as-colour) ≡ P(R↑) 2/3 2/3
P(drawing a green ball-as-object) ≡ P(G↑) 1/3 1/3
P(drawing a red ball-as-object) ≡ P(R→) 3/4 1
P(drawing a green ball-as-object) ≡ P(G→) 1/4 1/2
P(Heads| drawing a red ball-as-colour) ≡ P(Heads|R↑) 1/2 1/2
P(Tails| drawing a red ball-as-colour) ≡ P(Tails|R↑) 1/2 1/2
P(Heads| drawing a red ball-as-object) ≡ P(Heads|R→) 2/3 1/2
P(Tails| drawing a red ball-as-object) ≡ P(Tails|R→) 1/3 1/2
6. Handling the variations of the Sleeping Beauty problem
From the above, it follows that the present treatment of the Sleeping Beauty problem, is capable of  
handling several variations of the original problem which have recently flourished in the literature. For 
the above solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem applies straightforwardly, I shall argue, to these  
variations  of  the  original  experiment.  Let  us  consider,  to  begin with,  a  variation were on Heads, 
Sleeping Beauty is not awakened on Monday but instead on Tuesday. This is modelled with an hyper-
entanglement urn* that receives one normal green ball (instead of a red one in the original experiment)  
in the Heads case.
Let us suppose, second, that  Sleeping Beauty is awakened two times on Monday in the Tails case  
(instead of being awakened on both Monday and Tuesday).  This is  then modelled with an hyper-
entanglement urn* that receives one pair of hyper-entangled balls which are composed of two red balls  
in the Tails case (instead of a pair of hyper-entangled balls composed of a red and a green ball in the  
original experiment).
Let us imagine, third, that Beauty is awakened two times – on Monday and Tuesday – in the Heads 
case, and three times – on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday – in the Tails case. This is then modelled 
with an hyper-entanglement urn* that receives one pair of hyper-entangled balls composed of one red 
ball and one green ball in the Heads case; and in the Tails case, the hyper-entanglement urn* is filled  
with one triplet of hyper-entangled balls, composed of a red, a green and a blue ball.
 
Finally,  the lesson of the Sleeping Beauty Problem appear to  be the following:  our  current  and 
familiar objects or concepts such as balls, wakings, etc. should not be considered as the sole relevant  
classes of objects for probability purposes. We should bear in mind that according to an unformalised 
axiom of probability theory, a given situation is classically modelled with the help of urns, dices, balls,  
etc. But the rules that allow for these simplifications lack an explicit formulation. However in certain  
situations, in order to reason properly, it is also necessary to take into account somewhat unfamiliar  
objects whose constituents are pairs of indissociable balls or of mutually inseparable wakings, etc.  
This lesson was anticipated by Nelson Goodman, who pointed out in Ways of Worldmaking that some 
objects  which  are  prima  facie  completely  different  from  our  familiar  objects  also  deserve 
consideration:  “we do not  welcome molecules or concreta as elements of our everyday world,  or 
combine tomatoes and triangles and typewriters and tyrants and tornadoes into a single kind”.3 As we 
did see it, in some cases, we cannot add unrestrictedly an object of the Heads-world with an object of  
3 Goodman (1978, p. 21).
8
the  Tails-world.  For  despite  the  appearances,  objects  of  the  Heads-world  may have  ontologically 
different  properties  from objects  of  the  Tails-world.  And the  status  of  our  probabilistic  paradigm 
object, namely a ball, appears to be world-relative, since it can be a whole in the Heads-world and a 
part in the Tails-world. Once this goodmanian step accomplished, we should be less vulnerable to  
certain subtle cognitive traps in probabilistic reasoning.
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